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Uncertainty has an almost negligible impact on project value in the economic standard model. 
I show that a comprehensive evaluation of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude changes this 
picture fundamentally. The analysis relies on the discount rate,  which is the crucial 
determinant in balancing immediate costs against future benefits and  the single most 
important determinant of optimal mitigation policies in the integrated assessment of climate 
change. The paper examines two shortcomings in the recent debate and the current models 
addressing climate change assessment. First, removing  an implicit assumption of 
(intertemporal) risk neutrality reduces the growth effect in social discounting and significantly 
amplifies the importance of risk and correlation. Second, debate and models largely overlook 
the difference in attitude with respect to risk and with respect to non-risk uncertainty. The 
paper derives the resulting changes of the risk-free and the stochastic social discount rate and 
points out the importance of even thin tailed uncertainty for climate change evaluation. It 
discusses combinations of uncertainty and correlation that reduce the social discount rate to 
pure preference. In a theoretical contribution, the paper extends the smooth ambiguity model 
by providing a threefold disentanglement between, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and the 
propensity to smooth consumption over time. 
JEL-Code: D610, D810, D900, H430, Q000, Q540. 
Keywords:  ambiguity, climate change, cost benefit analysis, discounting, intertemporal 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Most long-term investments are subject to uncertainty. In the standard model, uncer-
tainty has an almost negligible impact on project value. I show that a comprehensive
evaluation of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude changes this picture fundamentally.
The theoretic contribution of the present paper combines intertemporal risk attitude
with smooth ambiguity aversion. Intertemporal risk attitude is a multi-commodity risk
measure that captures Epstein & Zin’s (1989) disentanglement of Arrow-Pratt risk aver-
sion from the propensity to smooth consumption over time. Smooth ambiguity attitude
is a concept developed by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci & Mukerji (2005) to capture aversion to
non-risk uncertainty, i.e. beliefs of low conﬁdence. I show and exploit the close formal
similarity of the two concepts.
The paper derives and discusses the consumption discount rate in this generalized
uncertainty model. The consumption discount rate determines the optimal trade-oﬀ
between current investment costs and future investment payoﬀs. In the context of public
projects, this consumption discount rate is known as the social discount rate. The U.K.
and France were the ﬁrst countries to explicitly adapt their discounting schemes for the
evaluation of legislation and projects to recognize uncertainty. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency is currently preparing a similar proposal to the Oﬃce of Management
and Budget. The economic insights underlying these political reforms are all based on the
economic standard model. However, it is well-known that this standard model gives rise
to a variety of puzzles in asset pricing under uncertainty, including the equity premium
and the risk free rate puzzles. These puzzles are easily explained by more comprehensive
uncertainty models. In particular, the ﬁnance literature shows and exploits the fact that
agents are more risk averse than they are averse to consumption substitution in the time
dimension: they are intertemporal risk averse. I demonstrate the importance of this risk
attitude for discounting and long-term evaluation.
Growth uncertainty alone implies a major adjustments of the social discount rate.
However, many projects have uncertain payoﬀs themselves. I show that correlation be-
tween project payoﬀs and economic baseline growth become highly relevant for project
value once discount rates incorporate general risk attitude. Examples of large scale
projects (or legislation) with uncertain payoﬀs include investments into basic research,
national defense, development of new energy technologies, or climate change adaptation
and mitigation. I focus my application on the latter example, a ﬁeld where the social dis-
count rate is currently most hotly debated (Stern 2007, Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007,
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Weitzman 2009, Dasgupta 2009, Heal 2009). As pointed out by Nordhaus (2007), the
social discount rate is the single most important explanatory variable when comparing
the optimal policy recommendation across diﬀerent integrated assessments of climate
changes: a social discount rate of 1.4% as chosen in the Stern (2007) review implies
an optimal present day carbon tax that is 10 times higher than using the 5.5% used
by Nordhaus (2008). Almost all large scale integrated assessment models are based on
the economic standard model. I show that in models of comprehensive risk attitude
uncertainty results in adjustments of the social discount rate in the same order of mag-
nitude. Moreover, in the climate context, there is support for positive, negative and for
no correlation between mitigation payoﬀs and economic growth. I ﬁnd that correlation
is highly relevant to optimal climate policy and, thus, the paper calls for a more careful
analysis which correlation channel dominates in the climate debate.
The paper focuses on analytic extensions on the Ramsey rule with simple tractable
solution. These formulas can be employed for applied evaluation. They also invite
back of the envelope calculations determining the relative importance of the diﬀerent
discounting contributions. Accounting for uncertainty in large scale economic models is
often computationally expensive. Then, these formulas guide a cost beneﬁt analysis of
model extensions. In order to derive analytic results, I restrict attention to isoelastic
preferences and normal uncertainty. This preference restriction also enables me to use
estimates from the asset pricing literature to compare the magnitudes of the diﬀerent
terms in the extended Ramsey equation (Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio 2003, Basal &
Yaron 2004, Basal, Kiku & Yaron 2010).
For my quantitative analysis I focus on the case of risk, where parametric estimates
have converged to a more reliable quantiﬁcation of general attitude. However, I show
that the analysis carries over immediately to the case of smooth ambiguity aversion. I
point out a striking analogy between intertemporal risk aversion measuring aversion to
conﬁdently known (or objective) risk and smooth ambiguity aversion measuring aversion
to subjective second order uncertainty. I show that, in consequence, the adjustments of
the social discount rate to ambiguity attitude are almost identical to the adjustments in
the case of intertemporal risk aversion. A major theoretical contribution of this paper
is a model that disentangles threefold between risk attitude, consumption smoothing
attitude, and smooth ambiguity aversion. I discuss the implications of the threefold
disentanglement for the discount rate, and employ the ambiguity layer to analyze the
impact of a low conﬁdence growth expectation as well as an 6ignorant prior over corre-
lation.
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1.2 Related Literature
The paper combines preferences disentangling risk attitude from the propensity to
smooth consumption over time with the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoﬀ et al.
(2005). The disentanglement of aversion to risk and aversion to intertemporal substi-
tution goes back to Selden (1978), Kreps & Porteus (1978), Epstein & Zin (1989), and
Weil (1990). Traeger (2010) extends the Epstein-Zin-Weil disentanglement to a multi-
commodity setting introducing the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. The main
insight of these models can be summarized as follows. Risk aversion generally has two
eﬀects on evaluation. First, stochasticity generates wiggles in the consumption path.
Agents with a propensity to smooth consumption over time dislike these wiggles. This
risk eﬀect, and only this risk eﬀect, is captured in the intertemporally additive expected
utility standard model. Second, agents intrinsically dislike risk because it creates uncer-
tainty about the future. This second eﬀect is measured by intertemporal risk aversion
(and is good independent). As opposed to a widespread believe, the von Neumann &
Morgenstern (1944) axioms support intrinsic risk aversion (Traeger 2010). In the one
commodity model of Epstein & Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) the disentangled Arrow
Pratt measure jointly captures risk aversion as generated by both, ‘wiggles’ and intrin-
sic risk aversion. The smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) and Klibanoﬀ,
Marinacci & Mukerji (2009) does not capture intrinsic risk aversion. I combine the
smooth ambiguity model with the disentanglement of risk aversion from the propen-
sity to smooth consumption over time. I show that the measure of smooth ambiguity
aversion is an analogue to the measure of intertemporal risk aversion.
Gollier (2002) shows in a model disentangling risk aversion from intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing a crucial condition for the social discount rate to decrease under
risk: the disentangled Arrow Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion has to decrease
in consumption. This ﬁnding closely relates to Leland’s (1968) condition stating that
savings increase under uncertainty if entangled Arrow Pratt risk aversion decreases in
consumption. The condition is widely believed to hold and, in particular, it is satisﬁed
in case of isoelastic preferences employed in the current paper. Apart from adding am-
biguity, the present paper complements and extends Gollier (2002) analysis in several
ways. First, I use quantitative estimates from the asset pricing literature to discuss the
magnitude of the various contributions to the social discount rate. Second, my formula-
tion in terms of intertemporal risk aversion collects diﬀerent contributions from Gollier’s
(2002) into a single simple-to-interpret adjustment of the discount rate proportional to
intertemporal risk aversion. Third, this reformulation in terms of intertemporal risk
aversion shows that Epstein-Zin preferences imply a largely equivalent adjustment of
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the discount rate as does smooth ambiguity aversion. Fourth, I extend the setting to
account for the important correlation between project payoﬀs and baseline uncertainty.
Paralleling the current research, Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) analyze the social dis-
count rate in Klibanoﬀ et al.’s (2005) smooth ambiguity framework. While I focus on
the analytic extension of the Ramsey formula and discuss the magnitude and relevance
of individual terms, Gierlinger & Gollier (2008) focus on general ambiguity attitude and
qualitative characterizations of the impact of uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. In
comparison to their paper, I sacriﬁce generality of functional forms for the sake of an-
alytic tractability and generality in terms of conceptual extensions. First, the current
paper adds stochasticity of the investment projects and shows how general uncertainty
attitude ampliﬁes the importance of the correlation between economic baseline growth
and the stochastic payoﬀs of the project. Second, Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) and, thus, Gier-
linger & Gollier (2008) conﬂate the disentanglement between the propensity to smooth
consumption over time versus risk states with aversion to ambiguity.1 In contrast, I pro-
vide a clear threefold disentanglement of all three preference dimensions. A more minor
diﬀerence is that my derivation of the social discount rate does not rely on an equilib-
rium assumption. In the climate change context, for example, mitigation eﬀorts are not
close to an eﬃcient Lucas (1987) tree model equilibrium as described in Gierlinger &
Gollier (2008).
Weitzman (2007,2009) argues that uncertainty gives rise to a low social discount rate
in climate change assessment. Weitzman reaches this conclusion by following a Bayesian
approach to modeling structural uncertainty. His analysis delivers a fat-tailed posterior
over damages that translates into a high willingness to pay for a (certain) transfer into the
future.2 Instead of following Weitzman’s path of augmenting uncertainty to somewhat
contestable levels, I follow the decision theoretic developments that treat uncertainty
attitude more comprehensively. Finally, following the original working paper version
of this paper, Ju & Miao (2009) put forth a calibration for a version of the three-fold
disentangling model I present here.3
1In the original smooth ambiguity model, aversion to standard or objective risk is set equal to
the propensity to smooth consumption over time. Only aversion to subjective risk, or second order
uncertainty, is disentangled from this intertemporal smoothing preference. Thus, the original smooth
ambiguity model conﬂates ambiguity aversionwith well known risk characteristics: already objective risk
aversion is usually larger than the propensity to smooth consumption intertemporally. Only introducing
such a disentanglement for subjective uncertainty results in an unfair comparison between the eﬀects
of risk and ambiguity aversion.
2For critical discussions of this approach, see in particular Pindyck (2009), Nordhaus (2009),
Horowitz & Lange (2009), and Millner (2011).
3They ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of smooth ambiguity aversion very close to the risk aversion coeﬃcients
I discuss in the context of risk aversion. However, their approach exogenously assumes a low value
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Section 2 provides the background to the paper, discussing the consumption discount
rate in the standard model and introducing the concept of intertemporal risk aversion.
Section 3 extends the discounting formula to intertemporal risk aversion and stochas-
tic projects. I apply the framework to analyze a stylized trade-oﬀ over time horizons
relevant to the evaluation of mitigation and adaptation projects and show how, in a
model of comprehensive risk attitude, already minor growth risk can reduce the social
discount rate to pure time preference. Section 4 incorporates smooth ambiguity aversion
and applies the model to second order uncertainty over expected growth and over the
correlation between project payoﬀ and baseline uncertainty. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Discounting the Future under Uncertain Growth
The consumption or social discount rate characterizes how the value of consumption
develops over time. This section lays out the basic setting and summarizes important
aspects of the recent debate over the correct social discount rate (Stern 2007, Nordhaus
2007, Weitzman 2007, Weitzman 2009, Dasgupta 2009, Plambeck, Hope & Anderson
1997). First period consumption x1 ∈ X is certain while second period consumption is
captured by the probability measure p over X.4 In the standard model, a decision maker
evaluates utility for every period and for every state of the world by a utility function u




The utility discount rate δ is known as the rate of pure time preference.
The decision maker faces a trade-oﬀ between aggregate consumption in the present
and in the future. Growth is stochastic and his utility is u(x)=x1−η
1−η , η>0,η =1 .G i v e n
x1, the consumption growth rate g =l n
x2
x1 is normally distributed with g ∼ N(μ,σ2).
The risk-free social or consumption discount rate r =l n
dx2
−dx1|¯ U characterizes a marginal
certain trade-oﬀ between the future (dx2) and the present (dx1)t h a tl e a v e so v e r a l l
welfare unchanged:




of Arrow-Pratt (and, thus, intertemporal) risk aversion. Then, their coeﬃcient of relative smooth
ambiguity aversion picks up the remaining aversion necessary to explain asset prices.
4Formally, X is a compact metric space and p ∈ P an element of the space of Borel probability
measures on X.
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The formula is a well-known extension of the classic Ramsey (1928) formula that makes
growth stochastic. More precisely, the consumption or social discount rate is concerned
with the right hand side of the Ramsey equation. Given incomplete markets, externali-
ties, and transaction costs, this right hand side is a preferred measure for optimality of
trade-oﬀs characterizing long-term projects and legislation that aﬀect consumption. I
emphasize the risk-free nature of the trade-oﬀ characterized by the consumption (or so-
cial) discount rate. The rate is good for evaluating deterministic projects in an uncertain
growth scenario. Frequently, the rate in equation (2) is also applied to evaluate certainty-
equivalent project payoﬀs, however, section 3.2 discusses why for stochastic projects the
stochastic social discount rate should be used instead. While the ﬁrst term characterizing
the discount rate reﬂects pure impatience, the second term is a consequence of economic
growth. The consumption elasticity of marginal utility η characterizes the percentage
decrease in marginal utility from a percentage increase of consumption. Together with
the expected growth rate μ, the term ημ characterizes the decrease of marginal utility
because of expected consumption growth. The parameter η captures aversion to in-
tertemporal consumption changes. These changes include expected changes captured in
the term proportional to μ and ﬂuctuations generating wiggles in the consumption path
captured in the term proportional to σ2. This aversion to wiggles in the consumption
path corresponds to the only risk contribution in the standard model and η is simul-
taneously interpreted as a measure of risk aversion. For the annual discount rate, the
parameters δ,μ, and σ are in the order of percent, while η is in the unit order. Therefore,
σ2 makes the third term 10−100 times smaller than the others and risk can be neglected
in discounting.5
The parameter choices of Stern (2007) can be approximated by δ =0 .1%, η =1 ,
and μ =1 .3% delivering r =1 .4% under certainty. While Stern’s team argues from a
normative perspective for these choices, the majority of integrated assessment modelers
refuses such a standpoint.6 A representative of this positive school is Nordhaus, creator
of the widespread open-source integrated assessment model DICE. His parameter choices
in the recent version DICE-2007 (Nordhaus 2008) are δ =1 .5%, η =2 ,a n dμ =2 % 7
delivering r =5 .5% (again under certainty). I already pointed out that this diﬀerence
in the social discount rate implies a factor 10 diﬀerence in the resulting optimal carbon
5Be aware that σ characterizes risk in the sense of volatility. In the climate change debate, risk is
frequently used to also denote a reduction in the expected value, e.g. as a consequence of catastrophic
events. Such a reduction would mostly aﬀect the expected growth term of the social discount rate.
6Moreover, Dasgupta (2008) points out that, from a normative perspective, an egalitarian choice of
δ =0 .1% should also call for a higher propensity of intergenerational consumption smoothing η>1.
7The growth rate is endogenous in the DICE model and has been reconstructed from Nordhaus
(2007, 694).
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tax. Introducing uncertainty with a standard deviation of σ = 2%(4%) results in an
adjustment of the risk-free rate by 0.02%(0.08%) in the case of Stern and 0.08%(0.3%)
in the case of Nordhaus. The lower standard deviation of σ =2 %i su s e db yW e i t z m a n
(2009) to approximate the volatility of economic growth without climate change and
catastrophic risks. The high standard deviation of σ = 4% is the rounded estimate
of historic consumption ﬂuctuations by Kocherlakota (1996).8 The values for the low
standard deviation are negligible, while the high standard deviation results in minimal
adjustments.
2.2 Intertemporal Risk Aversion
The standard model of the previous section implicitly assumes that a decision maker’s
aversion to risk coincides with his aversion to intertemporal variation. Epstein & Zin
(1989) and Weil (1990) derive an alternative setting that disentangles these two a priori
quite diﬀerent characteristics of preference. Traeger (2010) extends their framework
to a multi-commodity setting. For this purpose, the author introduces a new measure
of intertemporal risk aversion that measures the diﬀerence between Arrow-Pratt risk
aversion and the propensity to smooth consumption over time. The current section
motivates the Epstein-Zin generalization of risk attitude along the lines of intertemporal
risk aversion. Later sections use of the intertemporal risk aversion measure to give a
more compact characterization of the social discount rate adjustment under general risk
attitude and to show and exploit its similarity to the smooth ambiguity measure in the
case of general uncertainty. From the perspective of intertemporal risk aversion the
standard model is risk neutral. It only generates aversion to stochasticity because of the
wiggles in the consumption path and not because of intrinsic aversion to being uncertain
about the future. As a consequence, expressing the social discount rate in terms of
intertemporal risk aversion splits its constituents cleanly into those contributions arising
in the standard model and those additional contributions that are due to intertemporal
risk aversion.
The curvature of the utility function u in equation (1) captures both, aversion to
risk and aversion to intertemporal variation. A priori, however, risk aversion and the
propensity to smooth consumption over time are two distinct concepts. More generally,
welfare is characterized by two independent functions corresponding to these two distinct
8Kocherlakota (1996) estimates μ =1 .8% and σ =3 .6% based on 90 years of annual data for the
US.




−1 [Epf ◦ u(x2)] . (3)
Here, utility u is a measure for the appreciation of a particular consumption bundle that
derives from the willingness to trade over time. The concavity of u captures the aversion
to intertemporal consumption variation. The curvature of f describes intertemporal risk
aversion, which can be interpreted as aversion with respect to utility gains and losses.
Note that the curvature of f is a one-dimensional risk measure even in a multi-commodity
world.9 Opposed to a widespread believe, equation (3) – not equation (1) – is the general
representation of preferences satisfying the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) axioms,
additive separability over certain consumption paths, time consistency, and (ﬁnite time)
stationarity (Traeger 2007).10
A representation-free characterization of intertemporal risk aversion motivates why
the standard model generally falls short of capturing risk attitude comprehensively.
The general deﬁnition is provided in Traeger (2010). It requires at least two uncertain
periods. Here, I give a simpliﬁed characterization that, however, requires the absence
o fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c e . 11 Let   characterize preferences on X × P representable by
equation (3) with δ = 0. A decision maker is called (weakly)12 intertemporal risk averse,
if and only if, for all x∗,x 1,x 2 ∈ X
(x
∗,x













2,x 2) characterizes a fair coin ﬂip returning either x1 or x2.T h e
premise in equation (4) states that a decision maker is indiﬀerent between a certain
constant consumption path delivering the same outcome x∗ in both periods and another
certain consumption path that delivers outcome x1 in the ﬁrst and outcome x2 in the
second period. For example, x1 can be an inferior outcome with respect to x∗. Then,
x2 is a superior outcome with respect to x∗. On the right-hand side of equation (4),
9See Kihlstrom & Mirman (1974) for the complications that arise when trying to extend the Arrow
Pratt risk measures to a multi-commodity setting. Even more interestingly, measures of intertemporal
risk aversion can be applied straightforwardly to contexts where impacts do not have a natural cardinal
scale.
10Note that, in general, preferences represented by equation (3) cannot be represented by an evalua-
tion function of the form Us(x1,p)=u1(x1)+E pu2(x2).
11I abandon pure time preference for the sake of simplicity in the characterization only. This step
does not change the intuition of the axiom with respect to its general form. Obviously, I keep pure time
preference when discussing discount rates.
12The strong notion would involve the additional requirement (x∗,x 1)  ∼ (x∗,x 2) in the premise and
a strict preference in the implication.
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the decision maker receives x∗ in the ﬁrst period, independent of his choice. For the
second period, he has a choice between the certain outcome x∗ or a lottery that returns
with equal probability either the superior or the inferior outcome. The decision maker
is called (weakly) intertemporal risk averse if he prefers the certain outcome x∗ in the
second period over the lottery.13 I show in Proposition 5 in Appendix B that a decision
maker (with δ = 0) is intertemporal risk averse in the sense of equation (4) if and only
if the function f in the representation (3) is concave.
In the two period setting, the intertemporally additive reformulation of Epstein &















where RRA is the coeﬃcient of Arrow Pratt risk aversion. It is easily veriﬁed that
















1−η − 1i fη>1.
(7)
13The lottery on the right-hand side of equation (4) will either make the decision maker better oﬀ
or worse oﬀ than (x∗,x ∗), while, on the left-hand side, the decision maker knows that if he picks an
inferior outcome for some period he certainly receives the superior outcome in the other.
Calling preferences satisfying equation (4) intertemporal risk averse is motivated by the facts that,
ﬁrst, the deﬁnition intrinsically builds on intertemporal trade-oﬀs and, second, Normandin & St-Amour
(1998, 268) make the point that the conventional Arrow Pratt measure of risk aversion is an atemporal
concept.
A decision maker is deﬁned as (weakly) intertemporal risk loving if the preference relation   in
equation (4) is replaced by  . He is deﬁned to be risk neutral if he is both intertemporal risk loving
and intertemporal risk averse (relation   in equation 4 is replaced by ∼).
















To obtain the normalization used by Epstein & Zin (1989, 1991), multiply equation ( )b y( 1− β)ρ
and take both sides to the power of 1
ρ. Deﬁne U∗(xt−1,p t) = ((1 − β)ρU(xt−1,p t))
1
ρ. Expressing the
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The measure RIRA(z) depends on the choice of zero in the deﬁnition of the utility func-
tion u. This normalization-dependence is the analog to e.g. the wealth level dependence
of the Arrow Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.1516 Traeger (2010) further elabo-
rates that f and RIRA can be interpreted as a measure for the diﬀerence between Arrow
Pratt risk aversion and the willingness to smooth consumption over time.
Estimates of the isoelastic model usually build on Epstein & Zin (1991) and Camp-
bell’s (1996) log-linearizing the Euler equations. The estimation of the isoelastic model
is signiﬁcantly more challenging than in the case of the standard model.17 However,
over the recent years a somewhat reliable set of parameters emerges to be η = 2
3 and
RRA ∈ [8,10], explaining well asset prices and related puzzles (Vissing-Jørgensen &
Attanasio 2003, Basal & Yaron 2004, Basal et al. 2010). The message of these estimates
and calibration results is that agents tend to have a higher aversion to risk than to
intertemporal substitution. In contrast, the standard model forces both parameters to
coincide and the joint, entangled estimate falls somewhere in-between. For my quantita-
tive analysis, I use the entangled standard model with η = 2 as scenario “N”. The value
of 2 is widespread and, in particular, employed in Nordhaus’s (2008) integrated assess-
ment of climate change. The standard model implies zero intertemporal risk aversion.
For the disentangled model “D”, I use the values η = 2
3 and RRA = 9.5 singled out by
Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio (2003). These estimates imply a coeﬃcient of relative
intertemporal risk aversion of RIRA = 27. Depending on the assessment, I also provide
sensitivity scenarios or vary parameters on a continuum.
3 Discounting Under Intertemporal Risk Aversion
3.1 Risk Free Projects
Intertemporal risk aversion results in the following adjustment of the risk-free rate.
15In the standard model, the Arrow Pratt measure of relative risk aversion depends on what is
considered the x = 0 level. For example, whether or not breathing fresh air is part of consumption or
whether human capital is part of wealth changes the Arrow Pratt coeﬃcient.
16Note that positivity of RIRA indicates intertemporal risk aversion independently of whether f is




Moreover, measuring utility in negative units as in the isoelastic case for ρ<0m a k e sz negative.
Therefore, the deﬁnition of relative risk aversion has to employ the absolute of the variable z (Traeger
2010). The same reasoning applies to the measure of smooth ambiguity aversion.
17These models have to make assumptions about the covariance of consumption growth and stock
returns, the share of stocks in the ﬁnancial wealth portfolio, the properties of the expected returns to
human capital, and the share of human capital in overall wealth.
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Proposition 1: The risk-free social/consumption discount rate in the isoelastic setting
with intertemporal risk aversion is










In the presence of growth uncertainty, a decision maker exhibiting positive intertemporal
risk aversion RIRA > 0 discounts the future payoﬀs at a lower rate. In consequence, an
intertemporal risk averse decision maker is willing to invest in certain projects with a rel-
atively lower productivity than a decision maker who bases his decision on the standard
model. Gollier (2002) has derived an analogue of equation (8). In his representation the
single intertemporal risk averison term above is replaced by an Arrow Pratt risk aver-
sion and a prudence term. The slightly simpler form that I employ in equation (8) has
the advantage that it pinpoints the deviation between the standard model (RIRA = 0)
and the generalized isolastic model. Moreover, this representation will demonstrate the
formal similarity between the generalized isoelastic model and the smooth ambiguity
model in section 4.
In equation (8), the parameter η reﬂects only aversion to intertemporal ﬂuctuations.
Therefore, the term η2 σ2
2 is interpreted as the cost of expected ﬂuctuations triggered by
the aversion to non-smooth intertemporal consumption paths. I keep referring to the
expression as “the standard risk term”, as it is the only expression capturing risk in an
analysis based on the standard model. In the case of fully disentangled preferences (sce-
nario D, see section 2.2), the magnitude of the intertemporal risk aversion contribution
is





times that of the standard risk contribution. Figure 1 depicts the diﬀerent discounting
contributions as a function of η. The graph keeps RRA = 9.5, μt =2 %a n dσt =4 %
ﬁx.
The positive growth term (brown, dash-dotted) dominates for reasonably high values
of η. The intertemporal risk aversion term (blue, dashed) deﬁnes the main reduction.
The standard risk term (black, dotted) plays a very minor role in determining the overall
discount rate net of pure time preference (green, solid). Note that the intertemporal risk
aversion contribution is continuous at η = 1. Keeping RRA ﬁx, RIRA is itself a func-
tion of η as it measures the diﬀerence between Arrow-Pratt risk aversion and aversion
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r − δ
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Figure 1 depicts the diﬀerent contributions of the discount rate as well as the total discount rate net of
pure time preference r−δ. The terms are drawn as a function of aversion to intertemporal ﬂuctuations
η, keeping relative Arrow-Pratt risk aversion ﬁxed at RRA = 9.5 and using μt =2 %a n dσt =4 % .A
minus sign in the bracket implies that the term is negative and subtracted from the positive growth
term. The abbreviation ira denotes the contribution from intertemporal risk aversion.
to intertemporal substitution.18 Moving from the standard model with RRA = η =2
to the disentangled model with η = 2
3 implies two changes in the discount rate. First,
the growth eﬀect is signiﬁcantly reduced once η only captures attitude to intertemporal
substitution (brown dash-dotted line is evaluated further to the left). Second, intertem-
poral risk aversion reduces the discount rate (blue dashed line now subtracted from the
brown dashed line). This second eﬀect is the direct eﬀect of intertemporal risk aversion.
The ﬁrst one is an indirect eﬀect: moving from η =2t oη = 2
3 it is even larger in
magnitude than the direct eﬀect.
Figure 2 ﬂeshes out the crucial diﬀerence in the relation between risk and discount
rates in the standard model and a model of general risk attitude. The standard model
conﬁnes RRA = η. The thick colored line moving upwards from the origin depicts the
discount rate net of pure time preference r−δ in the standard model. The yellow region
of the otherwise red line reﬂects the most common preference speciﬁcations η ∈ [1,2].
Accounting for higher risk aversion in the standard model moves r − δ up along the
RRA = η line and signiﬁcantly increases the discount rate. In contrast, higher risk
18The Epstein-Zin preference representation in equation (5) implies a switch in the sign of utility




 as the actual measure of intertemporal risk aversion, as it is positive if and
only if equation (4) holds. I stick to the deﬁnition in equation (7) because this measure is completely
analogous to the measure suggested for smooth ambiguity aversion.
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Figure 2 depicts the total discount rate net of pure time preference r − δ as a function of η and RRA.
Moving along the thick (red and yellow) line keeps RRA = η, representing the only movement possible
in the standard model. The yellow part of the line marks the most common parameterization η ∈ [1,2].
Increasing risk aversion along this line necessarily leads to high discount rates. In contrast, increasing
risk aversion in the disentangled model corresponds to a movement to the left and reduces the discount
rate. The two thin black lines from right to left hold η ﬁx at 2
3 (D) and 2 (N), while increasing risk
aversion. The two thin lines moving up hold RRA ﬁx at 5 and 10, while increasing η.T h e c i t e d
estimates of the disentangled model all imply rates in the lowest corner of the shaded area between the
thin black lines. It is μt =2 %a n dσt =4 % .
aversion in the disentangled model decreases the discount rate. The thin black lines
going from right to left increase risk aversion while keeping η =
2
3 (D) and η = 2 (N).
The thin black lines moving up increase η while ﬁxing RRA at 5 and 10. All of the
cited estimates of the disentangled model imply discount rates in the lowest corner of
the shaded area between these lines. In contrast, an attempt to accommodate observed
risk aversion of RRA ∈ [5,10] in the standard model would imply discount rates far
above the 7% bound of the graph (plus pure time preference).
3.2 Stochastic Projects
The previous section derived an expression for the risk-free discount rate under in-
tertemporal risk aversion. Here, the only uncertainty is about economic growth. Many
long-term investment projects, however, are characterized by uncertain payoﬀs. A par-
ticularly important example is the evaluation of greenhouse gas mitigation and climate
change adaptation projects. Once stochasticity of the project is introduced, the corre-
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lation between project payoﬀ and uncertain economic growth becomes crucial for val-
uation. Lind (1982) argues for full positive correlation between project payoﬀs and
economic baseline growth. Weitzman (2007) points out that this standard approach
to cost beneﬁt analysis does not apply to climate change projects. The major areas
impacted by climate change would be “ ‘outdoor’ aspects (broadly deﬁned) like agri-
culture, coastal recreational areas, and natural landscapes”, which are little correlated
to technological progress. Moreover, some of these impacts directly aﬀect utility rather
than production. Various economists used related arguments to promote the use of the
risk-free rate for the assessment of climate change projects. Indeed, the risk-free rate
coincides with the discount rate for an uncorrelated stochastic project (see below).
A diﬀerent correlation is implied by some common integrated assessment models.
As pointed out by Nordhaus (2008), a high growth realization implies more production
and, thus, more emissions. Then, damages and abatement payoﬀ are both high. The
resulting positive correlation between growth (or wealth) and project payoﬀ is driven by
the production-emissions-damage link. I add a third consideration driving correlation
in the climate change context. The causal chain pointed out by Nordhaus (2008) and
captured in his integrated assessment model DICE relies on the exogenous growth rate
aﬀecting emissions. However, if climate change turns out to have severe economic impact,
then such impact is likely to aﬀect the overall economic growth rate (Pindyck 2011). One
transmission channel can be the mere straining of resources that would otherwise lead to
technological progress, or by deviating technological progress into adaptation technology
that merely serves to maintain the status quo. Dell, Jones & Olken (2008) ﬁnd evidence
that a similar channel indeed aﬀects the growth rates in developing economies already
at the moderate levels of climate change experienced in the past. Another transmission
channel can be the major distributional change going along with fresh water scarcity,
droughts, and agricultural yields in some regions of the world, which can trigger social
tensions within a society as well as international conﬂicts. In general, all three correlation
arguments (Weitman’s, Nordhaus’, and the one added here) apply to the evaluation of
climate change related projects and the integrated assessment of climate change under
uncertainty.
This section derives the discounting formula for projects that are correlated with
economic baseline growth. I show that general risk attitude creates a much more im-
portant role for correlation than played in the standard model. For stochastic projects,
the decision maker no longer trades a deterministic unit of consumption between the
present and the future. Formally, she trades a marginal unit dx1 of her current certain
consumption x1 against a marginal fraction d  of a stochastic project y with expected
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unit payoﬀ, i.e. Ey = 1. The future project payoﬀ y is correlated with uncertain future
baseline consumption x2. The stochastic discount rate is characterized as r =l n d 
−dx1









Ep(x2,y)f ◦ u(x2 +  y)


 =0d . (9)
I brieﬂy comment on this extension of the social discounting model. First, for a certain
project the marginal payoﬀ  y is certain and corresponds to dx2 in the usual derivation of
the risk-free social discount rate.19 Second, marginality in the trade-oﬀ that deﬁnes the
discount rate plays the same role as in any other economic price concept. The analytic
formula for the discount rate will characterize (in rates) the present value willingness to
pay for a marginal unit of the stochastic project. This willingness to pay depends on
correlation. Third, I formalize a trade-oﬀ between a marginal current unit and the ﬁrst
marginal part of a ﬁnite stochastic unit project y.20 Fourth, observe that the derivation
does not rely on an optimal allocation of an adaptation-mitigation-portfolio – an as-
sumption that would be inadequate in the climate change application I am particularly
interested in.
I assume that lny and the growth rate g are jointly normally distributed with stan-
dard deviations σy, σg, and correlation κ. The expected growth rate is denoted μg and
the condition Ey = 1 determines the remaining parameter of the distribution.21
Proposition 2: The stochastic social discount rate in the isoelastic setting with in-
tertemporal risk aversion is












+ηκ σgσy + |1 − η|RIRAκσ gσy .
19In this case the formula above reduces to a more precise notation of what is commonly written
as d
dx2...Ep...u(x2) – the diﬀerence being that the above notation makes explicit that (for y =1 )t h e
decision maker trades a certain unit (  or dx2) while having an uncertain baseline x2.O b s e r v e t h a t
also the ﬁrst period derivative in equation (9) can be rewritten as d
d 1u(x1 +  1y1)| 1=0,y1=1d 1.
20Modeling an inﬁnitesimal share of a non-marginal unit project rather than a marginal project itself
is important. It is well known that risk eﬀects are second order eﬀects. Therefore, stochasticity eﬀects
of an inﬁnitesimal project would vanish.
21Let μy denote the expected value of (the marginal distribution of) lny. The condition Ey =1




2 . Making use of this constraint, it is Var(y)=eσ
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2 . Thus, in the
percentage range, σy also approximates well the standard deviation of the project y itself. I will refer
to κ as the correlation between the project and the baseline even though, more precisely, it is the
correlation between lny and the growth rate g =l nx2
x1.
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The second line distinguishes the stochastic social discount rate from its risk-free relative
of the previous section. In the case of certainty about the project this second line
vanishes (σy = 0). The same is true if the risk of the project and the baseline scenario
are uncorrelated (κ = 0). The discount rate characterizes a marginal shift between
current consumption and uncertain future consumption. Therefore, risk aversion with
respect to the marginal project itself is a second order eﬀect that does not ﬁnd its way
into the discount rate. Stochasticity of the small project only contributes through its
interaction with baseline uncertainty. The second term in the second line of equation
(10) distinguishes the correlation contribution in a model including intertemporal risk
aversion from the correlation contribution in the standard model.
I assess the magnitude of the correlation contribution in the same growth scenario
as before with μ =2 %a n dσy = σg = 4%. I discuss the additional assumption that the
standard deviation of the project payoﬀ equals that of growth uncertainty in the subse-
quent section, where I further elaborate the importance of the correlation term in the
context of climate change evaluation. The standard correlation multiplier in Nordhaus’
setting N is ησgσy =0 .3%. In contrast, a disentangled assessment of the stochastic
discount rate (where η = 2
3 and RRA = 9.5) reduces the standard multiplier of the
correlation coeﬃcient to ησgσy =0 .1%, but adds an intertemporal risk aversion multi-
plier of |1 − η|RIRAσgσy =1 .4%. The correlation contributions in the social discount
rate are proportional to these multipliers and the correlation coeﬃcient. For example,
a correlation of κ = ±0.5 increases the social discount rate in the disentangled scenario
by ±0.8 to an overall rate of 2.4% and 0.9%, respectively (keeping pure time preference
at δ =1 .5%). These numbers make a strong point that under intertemporal risk aver-
sion the correlation between the project payoﬀ and economic growth is of ﬁrst order
importance for the discount rate. Figure 1 shows the dominant correlation multiplier
caused by intertemporal risk aversion as a function of η in light gray. It is the amount
added (subtracted) from the risk free rate when accounting for full positive (negative)
correlation and comprehensive risk attitude.
3.3 The Relevance of Future Risk
How relevant is uncertainty for the evaluation of long-term projects? Weitzman (2009)
emphasizes the importance of uncertainty about climate sensitivity and economic dam-
ages for the assessment of climate change policies. His analysis builds crucially on gen-
erating fat tails in a standard expected utility model. His interesting ﬁndings have been
criticized in a series of papers for their assumptions about the climate system as well
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as for stretching a too simple economic trade-oﬀ model beyond the domain where it is
meaningful (Horowitz & Lange 2009, Pindyck 2009, Nordhaus 2009, Millner 2011). The
current paper opens up a very diﬀerent perspective on how uncertainty aﬀects climate
change evaluation. Even without uncertainty about the climate system itself, uncer-
tainty about economic growth has a major impact on optimal climate policy. Including
uncertainty about the climate system, the interaction and correlation between growth
and project payoﬀs becomes a major ingredient for evaluating climate change and pric-
ing carbon. The section analyzes the relevance of growth and project uncertainty in the
model of comprehensive risk attitude.
The previous sections have shown that growth uncertainty reduces the discount rate.
The two period model of those sections is equivalent to a simple iid growth model.
However, once uncertainty becomes persistent it is well known that uncertainty not only
changes the level of the discount rate, but also its term structure (Weitzman 1998, Azfar
1999). Making the time step explicit in equation (8) results in












where variables indexed by T depend on the time horizon (payoﬀ period). For an iid
process like a Brownian motion the variance grows linearly in futurity T. Then, if
expected growth is constant (μT = Tμ), payoﬀs in period T are simply discounted at
T times the constant rate stated in equation (8). However, with persistent uncertainty
the variance grows faster and the term structure of the discount rate falls, i.e. payoﬀs
in the distant future are discounted at a relatively lower (yearly average) discount rate
than payoﬀs in the close future.
In the following I analyze the importance of uncertainty for the evaluation of climate
change in models with and without a comprehensive representation of risk attitude.
The analysis relies on the primordial importance of the discount rate for climate change
evaluation, impressively documented in Nordhaus’s (2007) simulation discussed in the
introduction. The reasoning does not rely on fat tails or diverging preference representa-
tions as in Weitzman (2009). I build the analysis around the following question: At what
level of riskiness do uncertainty eﬀects cancel the growth eﬀect in the social discount
rate? Growth discounting is the main economic driver of discounting. If uncertainty
eﬀects cancel the growth eﬀect, then future costs and beneﬁts are solely discounted with
t h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eδ. I compare the necessary risk level between the stan-
dard and the disentangled model and analyze how this risk depends on the correlation
between growth and project payoﬀs. A major advantage of approaching the uncertainty
comparison in this way is that the uncertainty analysis is independent of pure time
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preference - a parameter whose magnitude is most contested in the debate.
The analysis uses a time horizon (or period) of 50 years. Instead of iid growth shocks,
I now represent uncertainty in long-term growth (a highly intertemporally correlated
event). I keep the assumption of an expected 2% yearly growth rate of consumption. In
50 years climate change is going to aﬀect our planet severely under almost any forecast.
It will aﬀect economic activities directly as well as non-produced consumption. Some
events like changes in precipitation patterns (or land loss) can also cause social unrest
or war. Learning about climate sensitivity and, thus, an important ingredient into
the severity of damages is predicted to take place on a similar time scale (Kelly &
Kolstad 2001, Keller, Bolkerand & Bradford 2004).22 I will measure uncertainty in
terms of the variance of the growth process (and the project payoﬀ) and translate it
into the probability of being worse oﬀ tomorrow than today.
Corollary 1: The discount rate reduces to pure time preference, i.e. rT = δT ,i fa n d
only if,








































3. in the case of a general risky project
σyT =
(η2 + |1 − η2|RIRA)σgT − 2η
μT
σgT
2κ(η + |1 − η|RIRA)
.
The conditions for eliminating the growth eﬀect are identical for the risk-free rate and
for the case of a risky project whose payoﬀs are uncorrelated to overall growth. More
uncertainty is required if the risk terms are to cancel the growth term for a project whose
22While learning about the temperature eﬀects of our emissions is supposed to take even longer than
these 50 years, we are likely to learn more about economic growth in the meanwhile. The simple model
assumes full serial correlation and, thereby, does not considering anticipated learning during the 50
year period under analysis. Yet the model is a good enough ﬁrst order approximation for an assessment
of magnitude and cuts straight to the point. A model incorporating anticipated learning would be
signiﬁcantly more complicated and had to include a multitude of additional assumptions.
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Table 1 determines the risk that reduces the social discount rate to pure time preference.
κ = −1 κ = −0.5 κ =0 κ =0 .5 κ =1
η RRA RIRA σ % p % σ % p % σ % p % σ % p % σ % p %
N 2 2 0 71 7.9 82 11 100 16 140 24 / /
D 2
3 9.5 27 20 0.00002 23 0.0009 30 0.04 49 2 / /
S1 2 9.5 7.5 30 0.04 33 0.13 39 0.5 49 2 73 8.5
S2 2 5 3 42 0.8 47 1.7 55 3.6 71 7.9 120 19
Notes: σ = σy = σg=standard deviation; p =probability of being worse oﬀ in 50
years than today; κ=correlation coeﬃcient between project and baseline risk. The
κ = 0 case is equivalent to the risk-free social discount rate. Expected growth is a yearly
2% over 50 years. The settings are ‘N’ based on Nordhaus, ‘D’ for the disentangled
parameter estimates, and sensitivity scenarios ‘S1’ and ‘S2’.
payoﬀs are positively correlated to growth uncertainty. If the expected growth rate is
simply μT = μTwith a constant yearly expectation of μ, then equations (11) and (12)
show that only a standard deviation that evolves proportional to
√
T leaves the yearly
discount rate constant (at pure time preference). This fact illustrates once again that
the term structure of the discount rate is ﬂat only for iid uncertainty where σT ∝
√
T.
I analyze Corollary 1 using concrete probabilistic events. By p  ≡ P(x50 ≤ x1)
I denote the probability that anything including climate change causes society to be
worse oﬀ in T = 50 years than today. It is the probability mass in the thin left tail of
the growth distribution that implies a non-increasing standard of living between today
and in 50 years. For the subsequent simulations, I keep expected consumption growth
at a yearly rate of 2% and T = 50, which implies μT = 1. Table 1 summarizes the
numerical results for the diﬀerent preference representations and for diﬀering degrees of
correlation. The table follows part 2 of Corollary 1 assuming σgT=50 = σyT=50 (relaxed
further below). In the intertemporally expected utility standard model with N pref-
erences a standard deviation of unity eliminates growth discounting from the risk-free
discount rate (equivalent to κ = 0). This standard deviation translates into the large
probability of p  = 16% that society is equal or worse oﬀ in 50 years. In contrast, the
disentangled approach with a comprehensive treatment of risk attitude implies σ =0 .3
and p  =0 .04%. A chance of 4 in 10000 that we might not be better of in 50 years than
today seems quite reasonable. Then, we should not discount the future for growth in
the disentangled model. The probability necessary in the standard model is 400 times
larger. The sensitivity scenario S1 in the table leaves relative Arrow Pratt risk aversion
RRA at the estimate of 9.5, but increases aversion to intertemporal substitution η to
Nordhaus’ value of 2. This change reduces intertemporal risk aversion, but still results
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in a probability p  necessary to reduce discounting to pure time preference that is about
two orders of magnitude smaller than in the N scenario with standard preferences. Sensi-
tivity scenario S2 further reduces intertemporal risk aversion by also lowering the Arrow
Pratt coeﬃcient of risk aversion to 5. It still implies a p  almost an order magnitude
below that of the standard model.
The table also shows the important role played by the correlation between project
payoﬀ and growth uncertainty in the disentangled approach: correlation can change
the probability p  by several orders of magnitude. With disentangled preferences and a
correlation coeﬃcient κ = −.5 a probability of p  =0 .0009% is suﬃcient to make the
risk terms cancel the growth eﬀect, yielding a social discount rate that is equivalent to
pure time preference. In contrast, with a correlation coeﬃcient κ =+ .5 a probability
of p  = 2% would be needed. Under standard preferences these probabilities would be
8% and 24%, respectively. The stochasticity of the project with expected unit payoﬀ
can be characterized as follows. Let py = P(y<0.5 ∨ y>2) denote the probability
that the project pays less than half or more than double of the expected unit. The
interval σy ∈ [0.2,0.3] found for a non-positive correlation in the disentangled approach
translates into py ∈ [0.1%,2.2%], whereas the corresponding interval σy ∈ [.7,1] in the
N scenario translates into py ∈ [35%,54%]. For perfect positive correlation κ =1t h e
risk eﬀects can only cancel the growth eﬀect if the standard deviation of baseline growth
exceeds that of the stochastic project. Thus, condition (12) has no solution.23
Disentangling the two diﬀerent risks yields further insight. The left graph in Figure 3
depicts combinations of standard deviations that reduce the social discount rate to
pure time preference. The right graph translates these standard deviations into the
probabilities p  that society is equal or worse oﬀ in 50 years under the expected yearly
growth rate of 2% (growth uncertainty) and into the probability py that the project
pays out less than half or more than double the expected unit.24 The dashed lines
correspond to disentangled preferences (D), while the solid lines correspond to Nordhaus
preferences (N). The graphs demonstrate that more uncertainty of the stochastic project
decreases the baseline risk necessary for a reduction of the discount rate, if and only if,
the correlation is negative. For a positive correlation, higher project uncertainty also
requires a higher volatility of baseline growth if risk eﬀects are to cancel the growth eﬀect.
23The entries in Table 1 correspond to the intersections of the corresponding curves in Figure 3 with
the dotted 45◦ l i n e . T h es h a p eo ft h ec u r v e sf o rκ = 1 demonstrates why there is no solution to
equation (12) (no intersection of the κ = 1 curves with the dotted line).
24Note that such a translation into probabilities is possible because the marginal distribution of the
bivariate normal only depends on the volatility in the remaining dimension. Note that the vertical
range of the right graph corresponds to a σy-range of [0,0.5].
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Figure 3 depicts the combinations of standard deviations (left) and probabilities (right) of baseline
growth (horizontal axis) and project payoﬀ (vertical axis) implying a discount rate reduction to the
rate of pure time preference. p  represents the probability of being worse oﬀ in 50 years than today under
a normally distributed growth rate with expected value of 2% per year. py represents the probability
that the payoﬀ of the stochastic unit project lies outside of the interval [0.5,2]. The numbers labeling
the curves denote the correlation κ between baseline growth and project payoﬀ. The dashed curves
(originating at ‘D’) are based on the disentangled approach, the solid curves (originating at ‘N’) are
based on Nordhaus’ entangled preferences. The intersections of the curves in the left graph with the
dotted line (identity) depicts the σ values reported in Table 1.
The graphs clearly show the importance of the correlation coeﬃcient, already at rather
low levels of the project’s payoﬀ uncertainty py. Moreover, the graphs reiterate the order
of magnitude diﬀerence resulting from entangled versus disentangled preferences.
4 Ambiguity Aversion and Second Order Uncertainty
4.1 Ambiguity
A diﬀerent shortcoming of the intertemporally additive expected utility standard model
dominating the social discounting debate and climate change assessment is its assump-
tion that uncertainty can be described by a unique probability measure. In many real
world applications these probability distributions or risks are unknown. Diﬀerent strands
of literature capture non-risk uncertainty under the names deep uncertainty, hard uncer-
tainty, or ambiguity. In this paper, I employ and extend Klibanoﬀ et al.’s (2005) model
21The Social Discount Rate under Intertemporal Risk Aversion and Ambiguity
of smooth ambiguity aversion (KMM) to show how ambiguity aﬀects the discount rate.
In contrast to many models of ambiguity and deep uncertainty, the KMM model satis-
ﬁes normative desiderata including time consistency and other rationality constraints. I
show the close similarity of this ambiguity model to that of intertemporal risk aversion.
The KMM model captures uncertainty about the correct objective probability distri-
bution in terms of second order uncertainty: a subjective probability distribution over
objective probability distributions or risk. The model is particularly interesting and
applicable in the context of climate change and long-term economic growth: in both
situations we face too little data for long term extrapolations and insuﬃcient knowl-
edge about the underlying model, which prevents a conﬁdent objective derivation of
probabilities governing the future.
The basic structure of the model is similar to a Bayesian prior model. The Bayesian
prior is interpreted as ambiguous second order uncertainty. The crucial distinction be-
tween the smooth ambiguity and the standard Bayesian model lies once more in the
preference representation that accompanies the uncertainty model. In the standard
expected utility model, a decision maker evaluates objective ﬁrst order probabilities
and subjective second order probabilities with the same degree of risk aversion; which,
moreover, coincides with aversion to intertemporal substitution. In contrast, the KMM
model incorporates the ﬁnding that individuals generally prefer objective risk to sub-
jective risk. For this purpose, the model introduces a new measure of risk aversion for
ambiguous lotteries (subjective second order probability distributions). I will explain
that this measure of ambiguity is a close analogue to the measure of intertemporal risk
aversion. The original KMM model keeps entangled attitudes to objective risk. By in-
troducing ambiguity aversion, the model introduces intertemporal risk aversion only to
subjective lotteries, while keeping intertemporal risk neutrality for objective lotteries. I
extend the model to capture both, disentangled aversion to subjective and to objective
risk. I show that the resulting social discounting model is a clone of the model discussed
in the previous sections.
The decision-theoretic literature has developed a range of diﬀerent approaches to cap-
ture situations of ambiguity. I brieﬂy survey the most important ones in the remainder
of this section. One way to characterize non-risk uncertainty is by extending the concept
of probabilities to more general set functions called “capacities”. These set functions
weigh possible events but are not necessarily additive in the union of disjoint events.
Because of this non-additivity, the standard measure integral has to be exchanged for the
more general Choquet integral in order to calculate expected utility, giving rise to the
name “Choquet expected utility”. A second approach deﬁnes an evaluation functional
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that expresses beliefs in the form of sets of probability distributions rather than unique
probability distributions. The ﬁrst and simplest such representation goes back to Gilboa
& Schmeidler (1989). Here a decision maker evaluates a scenario by taking expected
values with respect to every probability distribution deemed possible and then identiﬁes
the scenario with the minimal expected value in this set.25 A more general representa-
tion of this type is given by Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004), Maccheroni,
Marinacci & Rustichini (2006a), and, in an intertemporal framework, Maccheroni, Mari-
nacci & Rustichini (2006b). There are several equivalence results between the Choquet
approach and that of multiple priors as well as rank dependent utility theory where a
decision maker uses distorted probabilities in an expected utility approach increasing
the weights given to small probability events. In the climate change context, the main
advantage of the smooth ambiguity model over these alternatives is its normative attrac-
tiveness achieved by maintaining time consistency and the essence of the independence
axiom. Just as importantly for my purposes, I want to show that the KMM model is
closely related to the model of intertemporal risk aversion and yields similar discounting
results. Finally, its similarity to the Bayesian framework makes the model not only easy
to interpret, but also allows me to relate to Weitzman’s (2009) discourse on structural
uncertainty.
4.2 The Generalized Model of Smooth Ambiguity Aversion
The section introduces the smooth ambiguity aversion model by Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005)
and, in an intertemporal setting, by Klibanoﬀ et al. (2009). It represents ambiguity
(non-risk uncertainty) as second order probability distributions, i.e. probabilities over
probabilities. The model introduces a diﬀerent attitude for evaluating second order
uncertainty as compared to ﬁrst order risk. Translated into the simple setting of this












For a given parameter θ, the probability measure pθ on the consumption space X denotes
ﬁrst order or “objective” probabilities over consumption. The expectation operator takes
expectations with respect to pθ. However, the parameter θ is unknown and so is the
correct objective probability distribution. The probability measure μ denotes the prior
25Hansen & Sargent (2001) give conditions under which this approach is equivalent to what is known
as robust control or model uncertainty, which again has overlapping representations with the model of
constant absolute intertemporal risk aversion presented in Traeger (2007).
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over the parameter θ ∈ Θ,26 which translates into a prior over the right probability
distribution pθ.
In Klibanoﬀ et al.’s setting, the utility function u corresponds to the utility function
of the standard model. It jointly captures aversion to intertemporal substitutability and
“objective” or ﬁrst order risk. The function Φ captures additional aversion with respect
to second order uncertainty, which they call ambiguity aversion. Note that, for Φ linear,
the model collapses to the standard Bayesian model. The coeﬃcient describing relative





In this paper, I combine Klibanoﬀ et al.’s model of ambiguity aversion with my model













In this generalization, u characterizes aversion to intertemporal substitution only, f
characterizes intertemporal risk aversion, and Φ characterizes ambiguity aversion.27
In the representation of equation (13), ambiguity aversion characterizes attitude with
respect to second order uncertainty similar to the way that intertemporal risk aversion
characterizes attitude with respect to ﬁrst order risk. This parallel is a fundamen-
tal insight about the smooth ambiguity model and will also emerge in the expression
for the discount rate. Moreover, the current generalized framework permits a three-
fold disentanglement of risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and aversion to intertemporal
substitution. The parallel between smooth ambiguity aversion and intertemporal risk
aversion (and, thus, a reformulation of Epstein Zin preferences) helps to get a deeper
understanding of Klibanoﬀ et al.’s (2005) concept of smooth ambiguity aversion. To
enable an analytic derivation of the social discount rate, I will once more revert to the
isoelastic setting. In addition to the earlier assumptions of section 2.2 and equation (6)
26
I pick a continuous parameter space Θ, while this parameter space is ﬁnite in Klibanoﬀ et al.’s (2009)
axiomatization of the model. Note moreover that Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005, 2009) setting features acts
rather than probability measures on the outcome space.
27In an alternative representation, I could apply the inverse of the function f characterizing intertem-
poral risk aversion in front of Φ−1 instead of its current position where it acts on the expected value
operator. Then, the same preferences are represented with a diﬀerent function Φ that would characterize
only “access aversion” to ambiguity as opposed intertemporal risk aversion.
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I assume Φ(z)=( ρz)ϕ, which yields a coeﬃcient of relative ambiguity aversion
RAA =

1 − ϕ if ρ>0
ϕ − 1i fρ<0.
4.3 The Social Discount Rate and Ambiguity about Growth
Weitzman (2009) recently argued that in the context of climate change the parameters
of the distribution governing the growth process might not be known. Like Weitzman, I
adopt a Bayesian setting to capture such a form of second order uncertainty. However,
Weitzman sticks with the standard risk model underlying equation (2), in contrast, I
introduce ambiguity attitude as formulated by Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005, 2009) as well
as intertemporal risk aversion. Taking the simplest example of Bayesian second order
uncertainty, I assume that expected growth is itself a normally distributed parameter
θ with expectation μ and variance τ2. Formally, that is E(g|θ) ∼ N(θ,σ2)a n dθ ∼
N(μ,τ2), preserving the interpretation of μ as the overall expectation of the growth
trend. The special case of Proposition 3 for RIRA = 0 and κ = 0 has independently
been derived by Gierlinger & Gollier (2008).
Proposition 3: The stochastic social discount rate in the isoelastic setting with in-
tertemporal risk aversion and ambiguity about expected growth is












+ ηκσ gσy + |1 − η|RIRA κσ gσy
−RAA




The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side reﬂect, once more, the discount rate in the
standard Ramsey equation under certainty. The third term −η2 σ2+τ2
2 reﬂects the well-
known extension for risk. Note that the overall variance of the growth process is now
σ2 +τ2 because of the additional layer of uncertainty characterized by the second order
variance τ2. The second line gives the corrections if the project is stochastic. This
correction remains as in the previous section. The third line characterizes the new con-
tribution to intertemporal value development due to ambiguity aversion. The term is
proportional to second order variance τ2, relative ambiguity aversion RAA, and the term
|1 − η2| already encountered in the correction of the social discount rate for intertempo-
ral risk aversion. In fact, the contribution of ambiguity aversion is formally equivalent to
the contribution of intertemporal risk aversion, replacing ﬁrst by second order variance
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and RIRA by RAA. Proposition 3 provides a full disentanglement between the contri-
butions already present under certainty, those arising under under risk but caused only
by aversion to intertemporal ﬂuctuations, the terms driven by intrinsic risk aversion,
and those brought about by aversion to ambiguity.
Quantitatively, a decision maker who is more averse to ambiguity than to risk will
lower the discount rate more for second order variance (ambiguity) than for ﬁrst order
variance (risk). Otherwise, the discussion from section 3 stays qualitatively the same. In
general, an ambiguity averse decision maker will employ a lower (risk-free or stochastic)
discount rate when the baseline scenario is ambiguous. He is willing to invest in a certain
or stochastic project with relatively lower productivity than is a decision maker who is
ambiguity neutral or just faces (ﬁrst order) risk.
Relating my result to Weitzman (2009), I ignore everything but the ﬁrst three terms
on the right of equation (14). The only diﬀerence between these remaining terms and
the standard equation (2) is the additional variance τ2 in the third term (standard risk
term). This additional variance is a straightforward consequence of making the growth
process more uncertain by introducing a prior (second order uncertainty) over some
parameter of the growth process. In the case of the normal distributions adopted here,
the variance simply adds up. From the given example, it is diﬃcult to see how adding
a Bayesian prior would bring the standard risk term back into the order of magnitude
comparable to the other terms of the social discount rate. Instead of a doubling, a factor
of 10 − 100 is needed. The only way to reach this result is by suﬃciently increasing the
variance of the prior. Eﬀectively, this is what Weitzman (2009) does in deriving what
he calls a dismal theorem. He introduces a fat tailed (improper) prior whose moments
do not exist. Consequently, the risk-free social discount rate in equation (14) goes to
minus inﬁnity implying an inﬁnite willingness to transfer (certain) consumption into the
future. Weitzman limits this willingness by the value of a (or society’s) statistical life.28
Instead of augmenting uncertainty, the above proposition introduces ambiguity aversion,
i.e. the term RAA|1 − η2|
τ2
2 , into social discounting, reﬂecting experimental evidence
that economic agents tend to be more afraid of unknown probabilities than they are of
known probabilities (most famously, Ellsberg 1961).
Current estimates of the parameter RAA in the KMM model are signiﬁcantly less
reliable than in the intertemporal risk aversion framework and I refrain from a numer-
ical analysis. Moreover, these models do not simultaneously estimate aversion to risk,
28Note that Weitzman (2009) puts the prior on the variance σ rather than on the expected value of
growth. He loosely relates the uncertainty to climate sensitivity. The above is a signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed,
but insightful, perspective on Weitzman’s approach – abstracting from learning.
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ambiguity, and intertemporal substitution.29 However, the similarity of the ambiguity
aversion eﬀect to the direct eﬀect of intertemporal risk aversion gives a good feeling for
the magnitude by which a given degree of relative ambiguity aversion changes the social
discount rate. Instead of redoing these simulations for ambiguity aversion, I will explore
the eﬀects of ambiguity about correlation between project payoﬀs and economic growth.
4.4 The Social Discount Rate and Uncertainty about Correla-
tion
In section 3.2 I discussed diﬀerent opinions on whether climate change related projects
result in payoﬀs that are positively, negatively or not at all correlated to baseline risk.
The standard approach in cost beneﬁt analysis assumes full correlation of a project
with the economic baseline risk. A similar correlation is supported by some integrated
assessment models. Weitzman (2007) argues that major areas impacted by climate
change are little correlated to technological progress as some of the impacts directly
aﬀect utility rather than production. He concludes that the correlation should be small.
I made the point that climate change starts becoming a serious part of society’s baseline
risk. Moreover, mitigation and adaptation projects pay out most in states of the world
where climate change turns out to be more serious. This reasoning introduces a negative
correlation with part of the baseline risk.
In this subsection, I introduce uncertainty about correlation. Taking the opposite
extreme of a perfectly known correlation, I assume an ignorant prior over the correla-
tion coeﬃcient, which permits an analytic solution. I am particularly interested in the
diﬀerence between complete ignorance about the correlation and the assumption of an
uncorrelated transfer. I assume that the correlation κ between lny and g (see section
3.2) is uniformly distributed between [−1,1].
Proposition 4: The stochastic social discount rate in the isoelastic setting with in-
tertemporal risk aversion and a uniform prior over correlation is













sinh{ησ gσy + |1 − η|RIRA σgσy}
ησ gσy + |1 − η|RIRA σgσy

.
29Paralleling this paper is a work by Ju & Miao (2009) using a similar model of threefold disentan-
glement. However, the authors ﬁx Arrow-Pratt risk aversion exogenously to a level signiﬁcantly lower
than in the cited estimates of Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio (2003), Basal & Yaron (2004), and Basal
et al. (2010), and then ﬁnd an ambiguity measure in the range these papers estimate for standard risk
aversion.
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The terms in the ﬁrst line resemble the risk-free social discount rate under intertemporal
risk aversion derived in section 3. The second line captures the eﬀect of uncertainty about
the project and its correlation with the baseline growth. This additional component is





, non-negative, and always reduces the discount rate as
long as z =( η + |1 − η|RIRA)σgσy  = 0. This latter condition is satisﬁed as long as
the project and the baseline are stochastic and preferences do not simultaneously satisfy




where the ﬁrst term already gives a good approximation for the magnitude relevant for
the yearly discount rate. In the setting with yearly iid growth uncertainty in section
3.2 I found that z was below one percent in all scenarios making h(z) negligible. Note
that the expression does not involve ambiguity aversion. While ambiguity aversion with
respect to the baseline (section 4.2) is a ﬁrst order eﬀect, ambiguity with respect to the
interaction of the project and the baseline becomes a second order eﬀect not reﬂected
in the social discount rate describing a marginal change.
In the 50 year scenario ignorance about correlation still only delivers a minimal
deviation from the case of no correlation. I employ again the scenario introduced in
section 3.3 and I assume a probability of p  =0 .1% that society will be worse oﬀ in
50 years than today. Then, in the disentangled scenario D ignorance over correlation
would reduce the average discount rate from an uncorrelated 1.3% to 1.2%. In the ﬁrst
sensitivity scenario (S1), where RRA = 9.5a n dη = 2, it would reduce the average
discount rate from 2.7% to 2.6%. The diﬀerences in the second sensitivity scenario
(average rate of 4.1%) and in Nordhaus’s scenario (average rate of 5.1%) are negligible.
The diﬀerence between the assumptions of ignorance over correlation and not being
correlated grows as the risk increases. For p  =0 .5% ignorance as opposed to being
uncorrelated reduces the average rate from 0.6% to 0.4% in the disentangled D scenario,
and from 1.5% to 1.3% in the S1 scenario, still leaving the last digit unchanged in the
S2 and the N scenarions (with average rates of 3.5% (S2) and 4.9% (N), respectively).
Thus, the intertemporal evaluation of uncorrelated stochastic projects and projects with
ignorance over the correlation coeﬃcient are both well approximated by the risk-free
social discount rate. Only a good estimate of the correlation will have a major impact
on the evaluation.
5 Conclusions
Most long-term investment projects are subject to major uncertainties. The assessment
of climate change is an important example. The recent discussion following the Stern
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review has put a spotlight on a particularly important aspect of intertemporal evalua-
tion: the social discount rate. The discussion is framed almost exclusively in a standard
intertemporally additive expected utility setting. I pointed out the limitations of this
standard model and derived various contributions omitted in this framework. Three of
these eﬀects already arise in settings of pure risk. First, decoupling Arrow-Pratt risk
aversion from intertemporal substitutability lowers the growth eﬀect in the social dis-
count rate. This is an immediate consequence of the empirical ﬁnding that the aversion
to intertemporal consumption smoothing η is overestimated when the parameter simul-
taneously has to capture the (generally stronger) aversion with respect to risk. Second,
decoupling these two a priori independent preference parameters also removes an implicit
assumption of (intertemporal) risk neutrality. I pointed out a simple characterization of
intertemporal risk aversion and have shown that a term proportional to the coeﬃcient
of relative intertemporal risk aversion further reduces the risk-free social discount rate.
The third contribution is for a stochastic project where payoﬀs are correlated to the eco-
nomic baseline. Here, intertemporal risk aversion signiﬁcantly increases the correlation
eﬀect in the social discount rate.
I derived conditions under which diﬀerent risks and correlations imply that the social
discount rate reduces to pure time preference, i.e. the risk terms cancel the growth eﬀect.
This risk is several orders of magnitude smaller when disentangling risk aversion from
intertemporal substitution rather than employing standard preferences. The current
literature argues for positive correlation between project payoﬀs and economic growth,
as well as for the lack of correlation. I added an argument for negative correlation: when
climate change becomes a major economic risk over the coming decades a bad state of
the world decreases growth but increases the returns from adaptation or mitigation
projects. Given the quantitative importance of correlation and aversion, I contrast
the cases of no correlation with an evaluation where the decision maker is completely
ignorant about the correlation between the project and economic baseline growth. While
complete ignorance about correlation makes the social discount rate smaller than in the
uncorrelated case, the magnitude of the eﬀect is low. Overall, the discount rate for
a stochastic project with ignorance about the correlation to economic growth can be
well approximated by the risk-free rate. In general, I conclude that risk is of ﬁrst order
importance to social discounting in long-term cost beneﬁt analysis and climate change
assessment. This is true in the case of thin tailed probability distributions as soon as
risk attitude is modeled comprehensively. Moreover, it is highly important to assess
possible correlations carefully.
A further correction to the social discount rate stems from aversion to ambiguity.
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Experimental evidence shows that decision makers are more averse to uncertainty in sit-
uations where uncertainty cannot be speciﬁed as risk. In the context of climate change,
these situations of ambiguity (or hard uncertainty) are ubiquitous. I use the smooth
ambiguity model to capture this distinction in uncertainty and in uncertainty attitude.
Moreover, I merge this model with the model of intertemporal risk aversion. The re-
sulting model permits a threefold disentanglement between risk attitude, consumption
smoothing preference, and ambiguity attitude. I point out the similarities between am-
biguity attitude and intertemporal risk aversion, in general, and derive that ambiguity
aversion has an analogous inﬂuence on the social discount rate as does intertemporal risk
aversion. The analytic derivations in this paper and their quantitative assessment serve
as a rule of thumb how risk, correlation, and ambiguity change the social discount rate
in the cost beneﬁt analysis of climate related projects as well as other applications where
time and uncertainty play an important role. Moreover, the modeling framework sug-
gests itself for a less stylized numerical implementation in integrated assessment models.
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Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :The ﬁrst step of the proof calculates the marginal value of
an additional certain unit of consumption in the second period (dx2)i nt e r m so fﬁ r s t























































































































. Further below, I make use of the relation 1 =
1−η
ρ .








2 + α(η +1 )− 1)
σ2
2







(1 − η)(η +1 )− 1)
σ2
2
































Proof of Proposition 2: For the isoelastic speciﬁcation and with the deﬁnition
U2( )=f
−1 
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equation (9) translates into
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 =0d  the following deﬁnition is useful.
V (a,b)=E p(x2,y)(x2 +  y)
ay
b. (A.4)





















α−1V0(α − 1,1) (A.5)
where equality between the ﬁrst and the second line follows from Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem. Analogously to step 1 in the proof of Proposition 1, I calculate




















































































































= δ +( 1− ρ)μg − [α(ρ − 1) + 1 − α]
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The ﬁrst line corresponds to equation (A.1) and, thus, equation (A.2), yielding the risk-
free discount rate under intertemporal risk aversion. Moreover, the random variable y
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eliminating the last bracket. Finally, 1 − α h a st ob et ob ee x p r e s s e di nt e r m so f
η (capturing the eﬀects of the standard model) and RIRA (capturing the additional
eﬀects of intertemporal risk averison). I ﬁnd for ρ>0t h a t
1 − α =1− (1 − η)(1 − RIRA) = η +( 1− η)RIRA
and for ρ<0t h a t
1 − α =1− (1 − η)(1 + RIRA) = η − (1 − η)RIRA .
In both cases this yields
1 − α = η + |1 − η|RIRA, (A.9)
which gives rise to the form stated in the proposition. 
Proof of Corollary 1:
In case 1 of the risk-free discount rate, equation (8) translates r50 =5 0 δ into the con-
dition η50μ
! = η2 σ2
2 +R I R A|1 − η2|
σ2
2 , which results in the stated equation for σ.
Similarly in case 2, equation (10), σ = σg = σy,a n dη50μg
! = η2 σ2
g




ηκ σgσy −| 1 − η|RIRAκσ gσy yield the result. Without the condition σ = σg = σy the
same reasoning gives statement 3 of the corollary. 
Proof of Proposition 3:


























I have to solve once more the equation
dV (x1,p,μ)=x
ρ−1












! = 0 (A.10)
for ln d 
−dx1. Making use again of the deﬁnition
V (a,b)=E pθ(x2,y)(x2 +  y)
ay
b,
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Acknowledging the equality of equations (A.5) and (A.8) and their similarity to the
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Substituting this result into equation (A.10) and solving for r =l n d 
−dx1 yields analo-
gously to the proof of Proposition 2 the discount rate


















The last term can be rearranged to the form









=[ ( 1− ϕ)+( 1− ρ)























completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Up to equation (A.11) the proof is identical to that of Proposition 3. In the next step,
in V0(α,0)
ρϕ
α the ambiguity parameter θ replaces κ instead of μg. Thus the ﬁrst integral































For the integrand of the second integral in equation (A.11), I ﬁnd






























































2 sinh[(α − 1)σgσy]
(α − 1)σgσy
.
Substituting these results back into equation (A.11) returns the second period welfare







































2 sinh[(α − 1)σgσy]
(α − 1)σgσy
.
Substituting this result into equation (A.10) and solving for r =l n d 
−dx1 yields analo-
gously to the proof of Proposition 2 the discount rate















By symmetry of the hyperbolic sine, the sign of (α − 1) can be ﬂipped simultaneously
in the numerator and the denominator. Using equation (A.9) to substitute for (1 − α)
then yields the result stated in the proposition. 
Appendix B
The following proposition formalizes how intertemporal risk aversion deﬁned in the sense
of equation (4) translates into the curvature of the function f in a preference represen-
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tation of the form (3).30
Proposition 5: Let preferences over X ×P be represented by equation (3) with a con-
tinuous function u : X → IR and a strictly increasing and continuous function
f : U → IR, where U = u(X)a n dβ =1 .
a) The corresponding decision maker is (weakly) intertemporal risk averse [loving],
if and only if, the function f is concave [convex].
b) The corresponding decision maker is intertemporal risk neutral, if and only
if, there exist a,b ∈ IR such that f(z)=az + b. An intertemporal risk neutral
decision maker maximizes intertemporally additive expected utility (equation 1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : a) Suﬃciency of axiom (4): The premise of axiom (4)
translates with β = 1 into the representation (3) as
(x
∗,x












Writing the implication of the axiom in terms of representation (3) yields
(x
∗,x







































































30Recasting the proposition for a strictly decreasing continuous function f : U → IR turns concavity
in statement a) into convexity [and convexity into concavity]. Replacing the deﬁnition of intertemporal
risk aversion by its strict version given in footnote 12 switches concavity to strict concavity in the
statement.
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Because preferences are assumed to be representable in the form (3), there exists a
certainty equivalent x∗ to all lotteries 1
2x1 + 1
2x2 with x1,x 2 ∈ X. Taking x∗ to be
the certainty equivalent, the premise and, thus, equation (A.15) have to hold for all
z1,z 2 ∈ u(X). Therefore, f has to be concave [convex] on U(x) (Hardy, Littlewood &
Polya 1964, 75).
Necessity of axiom (4): The necessity is seen to hold by going backward through the
proof of suﬃciency above. Strict concavity [convexity] of f with f increasing [decreasing]
implies that equation (A.15) and, thus, equation (A.14) have to hold for z1,z 2 ∈ u(X).
The premise corresponding to (A.12) guarantees that equation (A.14) implies equation
(A.13) which yields the implication in condition (4). Replacing   by   and ≥ by ≤ in
the proof above implies that the decision maker is intertemporal risk averse, if and only
if, f is convex [for an increasing version of f and concave for f decreasing].
b) The decision maker is intertemporal risk neutral, if and only if, f is concave and
convex on u(X), which is equivalent to f being linear.31 However, a linear function f
cancels out in representation (3) and makes it identical to the intertemporally additive
expected utility standard representation (1).
31Alternatively use ∼ a n d=i n s t e a do f  and ≥ in part a) and use Acz´ el (1966, 46).
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